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Abstract. Encouraging the growth of firms is a priority for many governments, so 
identifying the factors that keep firms small is extremely important for public policy. 
One of these factors might be the poor quality of institutions. In this paper, I test 
whether institutions such as corruption, law and order, regulations, bureaucracy, 
investment friendliness of the government and property rights affect the number micro, 
small and medium firms and their rate of growth. This paper uses data on micro, small, 
and medium enterprises (MSME's) from the International Finance Corporation and 
firm growth data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. It shows that better 
institutions increase the number of medium firms and encourage their growth, but do 
not have an effect on the number or growth of micro, small or large firms. These results 
suggest that changes in public policies are needed to improve institutions and foster 
the survival and growth of medium firms. 
 
Keywords: firms, firm size, firm growth, institutions. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Small firms in developing countries allow their owners to be independent 
and to make a living, but they do not correspond to the most efficient scale of 
production (Little, 1987). They create social opportunities, contribute to 
poverty alleviation, create some jobs, but they rarely create new products or 
services, lead to productivity improvement, innovate, attract new customers, 
or create new markets. The problem is that in many developing countries, 
there are many micro firms, but much fewer larger ones. 
 
Figure 1 shows the average number of micro, small, medium1 enterprises per 
1000 inhabitants for developed and developing2 countries. For both 
categories of countries, there are more micro firms than small firms and 
more small firms than medium firms. However, the large difference between 
the two categories of countries is that while there is one small firm for every 
                                                          
1 Micro enterprises have one to four employees for most countries, small ones have five to 19 
employees and medium firms have in general between 20 and 49 employees. 
2 The developed countries are the ones labeled high income OECD or high income non-OECD in 
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Developing countries are the ones labeled 
lower middle income, higher middle income and low income. 
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10 micro firms in developed countries, there is only one small firm for every 
14 micro ones in developing countries. Also, in developed countries, there is 
one medium firm for every 40 micro firms, and in developing countries, there 
is only one medium firm for every 49 micro firms. Thus, there are 
considerably more micro firms relative to the larger firms in developing 
countries than in developed countries. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average number of micro, small and medium firms per 1000 
inhabitants for developed and developing countries 
 
Why? Is it possible that something in these countries stops firms from 
growing and becoming more productive and innovative? Are there factors 
that affect only firms that reach a certain size, hindering their further growth? 
Poor institutions might affect firms differently depending on their size and 
possibly keep most firms small and unproductive. 
 
This paper looks at the effects of institutional quality such as corruption 
levels, bureaucracy, law and order, regulations, investment friendliness of 
the government, and property rights on the number and growth of firms of 
different sizes. I use MSME data from the International Finance Corporation 
and firm growth data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. I estimate a 
comprehensive measure of institutional quality from the six different 
measures and use an instrumental variable approach. I find that higher 
institutional quality leads to more medium firms, but has no effect on the 
number of micro or small firms. Institutional quality leads higher sales 
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growth and labor productivity growth for medium firms, but it does not affect 
the growth of small or large firms. 
 
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
on entrepreneurship, Section 3 summarizes how the variables are measured, 
Section 4 shows the econometric model, Section 5 presents the regression 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
This paper adds mostly to the literature on the role of institutions on 
different categories of firms. First, there are studies that look at the effects of 
institutions in general on entrepreneurship. Schiffer and Weder (2001) look 
at different institutional obstacles as they are perceived by firms. They find 
that small firms think they face greater business environment obstacles than 
medium and large firms.  Unlike this paper, I do not use the perceived 
institutional obstacles as they can be biased, instead I use more objective data 
to measure the different institutions and find that medium firms are hurt the 
most by bad institutions.  The difference in results could be attributed to the 
bias in the answers of the small firm owners who feel that are facing greater 
obstacles than the larger firms. A second study that looks at institutions in 
general is Sanandaji and Leeson (2012). They look at institutions and 
entrepreneurship measured as number of billionaires per million inhabitants 
and self-employment in one country in a correlation analysis. Unlike this 
study that shows only descriptive statistics and correlation graphs, I use 
measures of the number and growth of micro, small, medium and large firms 
in a regression analysis. Also, my data on different size firms provides a 
better picture on different types of entrepreneurship than the self-
employment data used in Sanandaji and Leeson (2012). 
 
Second, there are studies that investigate the effects of specific aspects of the 
institutional setting such as corruption, law and order, regulations, 
bureaucracy, and economic institutions. Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2009) 
find that corruption is related to entrepreneurial entry, especially for low 
income countries. Fisman and Svensson (2007) find that both the tax rates 
and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth in Uganda. Foellmi 
and Oechslin (2007) find that credit market imperfections generate rents for 
the incumbent entrepreneurs and create incentives for corrupt behavior by 
state officials. The authors conclude that if borrowing is limited, bribes 
prevent poorer, but talented individuals from becoming self-employed. I also 
include corruption as one of the aspects of the institutional setting and find a 
differential effect of institutions on firms, depending on their size. 
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Corruption can also affect firms through political institutions. In "Politicians 
and Firms", Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find that when managers control 
firms, politicians use bribes to make them to pursue political objectives. 
When politicians control firms, managers use bribes to make them not to 
push firms to pursue political objectives. In the same spirit, Faccio (2010) 
studies the differences between politically connected and non-connected 
firms and shows that the market share of connected firms increases with 
corruption. The author also concludes that the productivity of connected 
firms decreases with the level of corruption and that in countries with higher 
corruption, while connected firms are inefficient, connections provide the 
benefits that allow them to compensate for any lack of skills. In my paper, 
large firms are not affected by institutions (including corruption) probably 
because the negative effects of bad institutions are mitigated by the benefits 
earned through bribing politicians or through political connections. 
 
Ufere, Perelli, Boland and Carlsson (2012) use interviews with CEO's of firms 
and find that entrepreneurs, rather than being victims of bribe demanded by 
government agents, are themselves active perpetrators of bribery. My paper 
claims that large firms are not affected by bad institutional settings because 
they might have the resources to bribe officials to circumvent bad 
regulations, bureaucracy, or poor legal enforcement. 
 
Clarke (2011) shows that firms pay lower bribes than previously thought 
because owners misreport the payments in surveys. This is one of the 
reasons I am using a corruption measure estimated by PRS Group, a 
commercial provider of political and country risk forecasts, rather than the 
perceived (and possibly biased) level of corruption from entrepreneurs' 
surveys. 
 
The impartiality of the legal system and the observance of the law play 
important roles in the decision to become an entrepreneur and in the 
performance of firms because they insure that contracts are enforced, that 
loans are extended to good businesses, and that bankruptcy laws are 
correctly applied. Aidis et al. (2009) find that the rule of law enhances 
entrepreneurial activity. Antunes, Cavalcanti and Villami (2008) show that 
when the level of enforcement decreases, output per capita and the credit to 
output ratio decrease as well. They also find that there are more or less 
productive entrepreneurs in the economy. They explain that as weaker 
contract enforcement leads to a fall in the demand for loans for a given 
interest rate, entrepreneurs decrease working capital and firm size shrinks. 
Bonini and Alkan (2012) show that the legal systems play an important role 
in explaining the variance of venture capital investments around the world. 
Chemin (2009) looks a Pakistani judicial reform that provided judges with 
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more training and finds that as judges disposed of a quarter more cases, the 
entry rate of new firms increased by half. In my paper, I also include 
measures of the quality of the legal system by using the variable law and 
order from the PRS Group in the composite institutions variable. 
 
The regulatory and institutional environment hampers small firm growth in 
developing countries, according to the World Bank (2006). Fafchamps 
(1994) claims that dual industrial structure in African firms is driven by the 
fact that large African firms benefit from returns to size and government 
policies, while micro enterprises take advantage of special market niches, 
lower labor costs, and their ability to bypass laws and regulations. Medium 
firms are too small to capture returns to size and qualify for government 
support, but they are too large to avoid laws, regulations, and problems with 
labor motivation. In this paper, I also find that institutional quality including 
regulations have a large effect on medium firms and no significant effect on 
firms of other size. 
 
In addition to regulations, bureaucracy can also hurt businesses. In many 
developing countries, numerous unclear regulations translate into large 
business costs. Grilo and Thurik (2008) find that perception of 
administrative complexities plays a negative role for high levels of 
entrepreneurship. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) find that regulations 
hamper the creation of new firms. These regulations determine new entrants 
to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to 
grow more slowly. I also include in my analysis a measure of regulation from 
Freedom of the World and also consider the possibility that regulations have 
different effects on firms of different sizes. 
 
The quality of the economics, monetary and financial institutions is very 
important. Foreign and domestic entrepreneurs are weary of starting a 
business if the monetary policy is not independent, if there is instability in 
the country, if there are doubts that the country can play its debts or if the 
government is unfriendly towards businesses. Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) 
show that sound money (interference in law and politics and integrity of the 
legal system) is positively correlated with entrepreneurship. I also include a 
measure of investment friendliness (a measure of business friendliness of 
government policies).   
 
 
Data 
 
I use four categories of data in this study: micro, small and medium 
enterprise data from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) micro 
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enterprise dataset (Kozak, 2007), firm growth data from the Enterprise 
Surveys (World Bank, 2013b), institutional data from the International Risk 
Guide dataset (PRS Group, 2013) and from the Freedom of the World  
(Gwartney, Lawson & Hall, 2012) and finally, other controls from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013b) and from a new international 
tax dataset from Petrescu (2012a). 
 
The IFC enterprise data is compiled from multiple sources, mostly from 
various Census and other country level surveys. From this dataset, I use the 
micro variable that measures the number of micro enterprises per 1,000 
inhabitants. A micro enterprise is a firm that has few employees. Micro 
enterprises have one to four employees for most countries, except for a small 
number of countries where micro enterprises can have up to 200 employees. 
The small variable measures number of small enterprises per 1,000 
inhabitants. Small enterprises have five to 19 employees for most countries, 
except for some countries like the Philippines where they can have up to 99 
employees. Finally, medium measures number of medium enterprises per 
1,000 inhabitants. These firms have in general between 20 and 49 employees, 
though for some countries like Finland, they can have up to 499 employees. 
In my sample, countries have on average 36.18 micro firms per 1,000 
inhabitants, 3.22 small firms per 1,000 inhabitants and .87 firms per 1,000 
inhabitants. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of these variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 Obs. Mean Std. De. Min. Max. 
micro 402 36.18 39.13 0.02 225.32 
small 396 3.22 3.12 0.009 17.23 
labor growth small 135 0.12 11.43 -46.4 65.5 
sales growth small 137 4.63 11.87 -42.2 72.4 
medium 404 0.87 1.60 0 17.36 
labor growth medium 125 -1.35 11.14 -54.9 54.3 
sales growth medium 127 5.35 11.63 -37.9 59.5 
labor growth large 79 0.71 8.52 -16.3 29.8 
sales growth large 84 7.00 9.60 -12.2 50.9 
corruption 3567 3.01 1.36 0 6 
law and order 3480 3.71 1.46 0 6 
regulations 2009 6.40 1.23 1 9.4 
bureaucracy 3567 2.14 1.18 0 4 
investment friendliness 3480 7.34 2.60 0 12 
property rights 1962 5.52 1.82 1.1 9.6 
institutions 1525 5.49 2.16 0 10 
instrument 1512 5.48 1.83 2.38 8.36 
credit 6922 49.80 45.65 -72.99 340.92 
corporate rate 3694 30.99 13.08 0 75 
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personal rate 3265 35.53 17.91 0 150 
inflation 7907 36.67 456.71 -49.42 26762.02 
ln(gdp/cap) 7988 7.65 1.60 3.99 11.59 
Source: Kozak (2007), Petrescu (2012a), PRS Group (2013) Gwartney et al. (2012) and 
World Bank (2013a, b). 
 
The Enterprise Surveys (World Bank, 2013a) complies data from surveys ran 
on 130,000 firms of different sizes in 135 countries starting with 2002. I use 
the country level data on sales growth rates and labor productivity growth 
rates for small, medium and large firms. The dataset does not provide these 
aggregate variables for micro firms. 
 
I use six variables from the International Country Risk Guide and from 
Freedom of the World (corruption, law and order, regulations, bureaucracy, 
investment friendliness and property rights). The variable corruption 
measures the lack of corruption, so higher numbers mean less corruption. It 
is "a measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to 
foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, 
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and 
introducing inherent instability into the political process" according to the 
PRS Group (2013). It varies from zero to six, with countries such as 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Liberia taking the value zero and countries like 
Canada, Denmark, or Finland taking the value six. Developing countries are 
more corrupt than developed countries with a corruption score of only 2.47 
relative to a much higher score of 4.12 in developed countries. 
 
Law and order represents "two measures comprising one risk component. 
Each sub-component equals half of the total. The 'law' sub-component 
assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the 'order' sub-
component assesses popular observance of the law" according to the PRS 
Group (2013). It varies between zero and six, where zero means poor law and 
order and six means excellent law and order. Countries such as Congo, Dem. 
Rep, Somalia, or Sri Lanka have a score of zero and countries such as Iceland, 
Luxembourg, or Spain have a score of six. On average, the developing 
countries have poorer legal institutions than developed countries with an 
average score of 3.04 compared to a higher one of 5.06 in developed 
countries. 
 
The Freedom of the World variable for regulations measures regulations of 
credit, labor and business. The index varies between one and 9.4 and high 
numbers means better regulations. 
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The property rights index from the Freedom of the World measures the legal 
structure and security of the property rights. It is a composite index of 
judicial independence, impartial counts, protection of intellectual property, 
military interference in rule of law and the political process and the integrity 
of the legal system. The measure varies between 1.1 and 9.6 and higher 
values represent better property rights. 
 
The variable bureaucracy measures bureaucracy quality. The PRS Group 
(2013) describes it as follows: "institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy 
when governments change." It varies from zero to four, with higher values 
meaning lower bureaucracy. Countries such as Angola, El Salvador, or 
Ethiopia take value zero and countries like Switzerland, United Kingdom or 
United States take value four. Developing countries are more bureaucratic 
than developed countries with an average bureaucracy quality of only 1.57 
compared to 3.33 in developed countries. 
 
Investment friendliness is a measure of the government's attitude toward 
inward investment as determined by four components: the risk to 
operations, taxation, repatriation, and labor costs. It varies from 0 to 12, 
where higher numbers mean a better attitude toward investment. Countries 
like Switzerland, United States and United Kingdom score 12 out of 12. 
 
However, these six variables are highly correlated and thus, one cannot 
distinguish the individual effects of one variable in a regression. Table 2 
shows the correlation matrix for these six variables. Thus, I use the 
information from these six variables and create one comprehensive 
institutions variable.  I fit a principal factor model on the z-scores of the six 
variables and I estimate the first factor. I take only the first factor because it 
has the eigenvalue of 3.94, the only factor with an eigenvalue above one 
(considered a critical value, below which the factors do not offer additional 
information). The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) of sampling adequacy 
for the first factor is .83 and the KMO for each variable is above .78. The KMO 
varies between 0 and 1, and an overall value of .83 is considered a 
"meritorious" value showing that the variables have enough in common to 
warrant factor analysis. The first factor is rescaled from a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 represents poor institutions and 10, good institutions. On average, 
Congo, Dem. Rep has the lowest average of .80 and New Zealand has the 
highest average of 9.64. 
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Table 2. Correlation between institutional measures 
 corruption 
law and 
order 
regula-
tions 
bureau-
cracy 
business 
friendliness 
property 
rights 
corruption 1      
law and order 0.6496 1     
regulations 0.3376 0.4226 1    
bureaucracy 0.6672 0.6323 0.5131 1   
business 
friendliness 0.3627 0.4722 0.6241 0.5516 1  
property 
rights 0.7067 0.845 0.5714 0.766 0.5965 1 
Source: PRS Group (2013) and Gwartney et al. (2012)  
I also construct an instrument for the above institutions indicator by 
averaging the institutions values for countries from the same income group 
as the country analyzed. I use the World Bank's classification of countries 
into: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, high income 
OECD and high income non-OECD. For a country k in year t, the instrument is 
the average value for the institutions variable for all the other countries than 
k in the same income group as k in year t. The mean value for the variable 
instrument is 5.48 and it varies from 2.38 to 8.36. 
The fourth category is macroeconomic controls. The tax data measure the 
highest marginal personal and corporate income tax rates. On average, 
developing countries have higher top rates for corporate taxes (32.76% 
relative to 28.26%) and higher top rates for personal taxes (36.31% relative 
to 34.22%) than developed countries. This can be easily explained due to the 
inability of most developing countries to collect tax revenue which constantly 
leads them to raise taxes to reach a particular level of tax revenue per GDP.  
Other controls are ln(GDP/capita), inflation, the inflation rate based on the 
GDP deflator, and credit, the domestic credit as percentage of GDP. 
 
Although macro level data from all sources cover 232 countries and 53 years, 
the final number of observations used in the analysis is very small. The 
number of observations in some regressions is that small in large part 
because the aggregate Enterprise Surveys data have few observations for the 
growth variables. 
 
 
Model 
 
Using these data, I estimate the effects of institutions on the number of micro, 
small, and medium enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants, on the labor 
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productivity growth and sales growth for small, medium and large firms. 
Specifically, I estimate a fixed effects model of the form: 
 
(1)     firmsk,t =β₀+β₁institutionsk,t+β₂creditk,t+ β₃corporate 
ratek,t+β₄personal ratek,t+β₅inflationk,t+β₆lnGDP/capk,t+ϑt+θk+εk,t 
 
 where k is the index for country and t is the index for year. Firms stand for 
the number of micro firms per 1000 inhabitants, number of small firms per 
1000 inhabitants, labor productivity growth for small firms, sales growth for 
small firms, number of medium firms per 1000 inhabitants, labor 
productivity growth for medium firms, sales growth for medium firms, labor 
productivity for large firms, and sales growth for large firms. I include also 
year dummies ϑt and country fixed effects θk. εk,t is the error term. 
 
I estimate (1) separately for firms of different sizes because I expect 
institutions to affect companies in different ways depending on their size. 
Each of the six variables used in the comprehensive institutions measure 
describes an important aspect of the institutional settings that affect firms. I 
include in the analysis corruption levels because I expect that corruption 
increases the costs of doing business for some firms. However, there might 
be two opposing effects of corruption on large firms: first, negative ones due 
to the increase in costs because of extortion by corrupt officials or due to 
unfair competition from other firms that use bribes to obtain unfair 
advantages and second, a positive one due to unfair advantages earned 
illegally through large bribes or political connections that only large firms 
can afford. 
 
Low quality legal systems can harm firms by making starting and operating 
a firm very difficult. It is likely that these negative effects are smaller for 
smaller firms because they interact less with the legal system especially if 
they operate partially underground. As they grow, medium firms start having 
more contracts to reinforce, more legal hurdles to overcome and they 
interact more often with the legal system and can be hurt by slow legal 
processes or corrupt practices of judges. Very large firms are likely to have 
the resources to hire expensive lawyers or to bribe judges to avoid the 
negative effects of a bad legal sector. 
 
Regulations are not likely to affect very small firms because they usually do 
not have to abide by regulations. Cumbersome regulation can translate into 
a large business cost for firms as they grow. Medium firms need to abide by 
regulations, but they do not have the resources necessary to disentangle 
unclear regulations and thus, they are harmed the most by regulations. 
Unlike medium firms, larger firms might be able to afford to hire outside 
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consultants, to bribe regulators, or even to bribe politicians to change 
regulations in their favor and thus are hurt less by these institutions. 
 
Bureaucracy is likely to negatively affect both the number of businesses and 
their growth. Micro and small firms have less paperwork due to their size and 
due to the fact they perform mostly underground. Medium firms deal with 
more red tape that translate into a higher business cost. Large firms have to 
cope with even higher bureaucracy, but this can serve both as a business cost 
and as a benefit if they can use the vast amount of red tape to hide 
irregularities in a bad institutional environment. 
 
Investment friendliness describes the government's attitude towards 
businesses and the policies targeting the business sector. Micro and small 
firms are probably affected very little by these policies since they operate 
entirely or partially underground. Large firms might be able to weather bad 
policies and maybe even try to influence them through bribing politicians. 
Medium firms are left to cope with bad policies and an unfriendly investment 
environment and thus, are hit the most by investment friendliness. 
 
Property rights are not essential for micro and small firms that might not 
immediately apply for patents. Also since they mostly operate underground, 
property rights are not relevant to them. However, as firms grow and might 
want to move into the formal sector and to innovate, property rights start to 
matter. Very large firms could find the resources to avoid the negative effects 
of bad property rights through support from the corrupt officials or even by 
exploiting bad property rights rules to their advantage in a bad institutional 
environment. Thus, the quality of property rights affects mostly medium 
firms that want to innovate, but they cannot do it properly because their 
ideas are not properly protected. 
 
Credit is a proxy for the easiness with which firms can obtain financing. The 
easier it is to access bank credit, the easier it is to open a small business. Thus, 
the effect of credit on the number of firms is likely to be positive. Access to 
credit is important for firms of all sizes, though probably less important for 
small firms that operate underground and have no opportunity to access 
credit. 
 
High corporate and personal income tax rates are likely to have a negative 
effect on the number of firms. Micro and small firms might be able to escape 
the tax authorities and evade more and thus, the effects of taxes on these 
types of firms could be smaller. Large firms might have the ability to use 
complicated accounting techniques to avoid taxes and thus, the tax effect 
might be small as well. Taxes might have a large effect on medium firms if 
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they are large enough to be observed by tax officials and do not have the 
resources to pay bribes to corrupt tax authorities (Petrescu, 2012b). 
 
Inflation might affect the number of micro and small firms positively, as 
people don't want to be wage employed when inflation is high because wage 
income adjusts slower to inflation compared to self-employment income. The 
effect of inflation on the growth of firms is likely to be negative because it 
creates instability that can hurt businesses. 
 
Finally, higher GDP per capita is likely to lead to more firms of all sizes. As the 
economy is booming, there are more business opportunities, there is more 
entry and more firm growth.  
 
I include country fixed effects because I use a wide range of countries in the 
analysis and there might be characteristics of the countries that I do not 
capture in the control variables. I also include time dummies, there might be 
worldwide events that affect the emergence and growth of firms in the 25-
year interval covered in the analysis. 
 
Since institutions and the dependent variables are likely to be endogenous, I 
use an instrumental variable approach. I instrument institutions with mean 
institutions of the other countries in the same income group, instrument. The 
instrument is correlated with the institutions variable because countries in 
the same income group are likely to be in similar stages of institutional 
development. The instrument is unlikely to affect the number or growth of 
firms through other channels than through the quality of the institutions in 
the country. The first stage regression for this approach is:  
 
(2)  institutionsk,t =β₀+β₁instrumentk,t+β₂creditk,t+β₃corporate 
ratek,t+β₄personal ratek,t+β₅inflationk,t+β₆lnGDP/capk,t+ϑt+θk+εk,t 
 
Results 
 
I show the effects of institutions on micro firms in Table 3. All specifications 
have country fixed effects, year dummies and robust standard errors. The 
first column shows that institutions do not affect the number of micro 
enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants if we control for credit, corporate and 
personal income tax rates, inflation, and GDP growth. Since the number of 
firms and the quality of institutions can be endogenous, I use an instrument 
for the quality of institutions, instrument. The second column shows the first 
stage of this specification. The coefficient of the instrument is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level showing a high degree of correlation of the 
instrument with the endogenous variable. The F-statistic is over ten. The next 
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column shows the second stage of the regression with average institutional 
quality in the same income group as an instrument for institutional quality. 
Even after the endogeneity is addressed, the effects of institutions on the 
number of micro enterprises per 1000 inhabitants is not statistically 
different from zero. As predicted, these micro firms operate under the radar, 
do not have to interact with public institutions too often or abide by 
regulations and thus, a poor institutional environment do not affect them 
significantly.  I am not able to look at the effects of institutions on the growth 
of micro enterprises because the Enterprise Surveys do not report the 
aggregate values for the growth of micro enterprises. 
 
Table 3. Effects of institutions on micro enterprises 
 (1) 
micro 
(2) 
institutions 
(3) 
micro 
institutions -1.50 
(2.42) 
 
57.53 
(36.89) 
instrument 
 
0.64 
(0.19)*** 
 
credit -0.23 
(0.18) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
-0.06 
(0.19) 
corporate rate -0.04 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.21 
(0.62) 
personal rate 0.08 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(0.004)*** 
0.63 
(0.86) 
inflation -0.56 
(0.35) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.09 
(0.78) 
ln(gdp/cap) 14.89 
(21.50) 
1.12 
(0.39)*** 
-121.74 
(97.16) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq. (overall) 0.0269 0.7175 0.0001 
Observations 214 1158 214 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients is shown as follows: * at 10%; 
** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 
Next, in Table 4, I present the effects of institutions on small firms.  
 
Table 4. The effects of institutions on small firms 
 
(1) 
small 
(2) 
labor 
growth 
small 
(3) 
sales 
growth 
small 
(4) 
institu-
tions 
(5) 
small 
(6) 
labor 
growth 
small 
(7) 
sales 
growth 
small 
institutions 0.61 
(0.34)* 
20.25 
(7.76)*** 
23.57 
(7.75)*** 
 
102.07 
(1745.39) 
28.08 
(26.29) 
27.11 
(26.51) 
instrument 
   
0.64 
(0.19)*** 
   
credit 0.01 
(0.009) 
-0.23 
(0.29) 
-0.14 
(0.29) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.15 
(2.44) 
-0.26 
(0.38) 
-0.15 
(0.38) 
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corporate 
rate 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
1.41 
(1.23) 
1.95 
(1.25) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.43   
(7.79) 
1.76 
(2.001) 
2.11 
(2.01) 
personal rate 
0.08 
(0.04)* 
-0.38 
(0.29) 
-0.42 
(0.29) 
-0.01 
(0.004)**
* 
1.05   
(16.81) 
-0.40 
(0.32) 
-0.43 
(0.33) 
inflation -0.03 
(0.04) 
0.46 
(0.37) 
0.45 
(0.34) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.57   
(10.55) 
0.69 
(0.89) 
0.55 
(0.90) 
ln(gdp/cap) 3.50 
(2.34) 
-55.23 
(33.20)* 
-45.45 
(37.33) 
1.12 
(0.39)*** 
-106.77   
(1898.91) 
-70.49 
(65.58) 
-52.35 
(66.13) 
Country-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq. (overall) 0.1508 0.0338 0.0491 0.7175 0.0664 0.0336 0.0456 
Observations 208 68 69 1158 208 68 69 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients is shown as follows: * at 10%; 
** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 
The fixed effects specification in column (1) shows that an increase of one 
point in the institutions leads to an increase of .61 firms per 1,000 
inhabitants. One point increase in institutions is equivalent to improving the 
institutions of Congo, Dem. Rep. to be at the level of Zimbabwe. Such a change 
leads to an increase of .61 small firms per 1,000 inhabitants or an increase of 
31,103 firms for Congo, Dem. Rep. Alternatively, an increase of one standard 
deviation in institutions leads to an increase of 0.42 standard deviations in 
number of small enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants. 
 
In columns (2-3), I estimate the effects of institutions on labor productivity 
and sales growth for small firms using the Enterprise Surveys aggregate 
measures. Columns (2) and (3) show that an increase in institutions leads to 
an increase of labor productivity growth and sales growth. The effects are 
large since an increase of one point in the quality of institutions leads to an 
increase of 20.25% in labor productivity and 23.57% in sales growth for 
small firms. However, this positive result might be the outcome of 
endogeneity, so I use the same instrument as before to correct for this 
problem. 
 
Column (4) shows the first stage regression (the same as in the previous 
table) and columns (5-7) show the second stages for the specifications with 
number of small enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants, labor productivity growth 
and sales growth as dependent variables.  In these specifications, the 
coefficients of the institutions remain positive, but they are not significant at 
10% level. Thus, institutions are not a significant determinant of the number 
of small firms or of small firm growth. 
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In Table 5, I investigate if the quality of institutions affects medium firms. 
First, the quality of institutions seems to affect positively the number of 
medium enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants in a fixed effects specification. An 
increase of one point in the quality of institutions leads to an increase of .31 
medium firms per 1,000 inhabitants. Institutions also increase the labor 
productivity growth by 26.39% and the sales growth by 28.39%. This time, 
even after I instrument with the average institutions in the same income 
group, the effects remain positive and significant. The magnitudes of the 
effects are much larger than in the columns (1-3).  One point increase in the 
institutions variable leads to an increase of 2.28 medium firms per 1,000 
inhabitants, 50.79% in labor productivity growth and 58.20% in sales 
growth. Thus, improving the institutions of Congo, Dem. Rep. to be at the level 
of the ones in Zimbabwe leads to an increase of 2.28 medium firms per 1,000 
inhabitants or an increase of 116,255 medium firms in Congo, Dem. Rep. It 
seems that medium firms are very sensitive to the institutional environment 
and moderate improvements in institutions can lead to more medium firms 
and higher growth. 
 
Table 5. The effects of institutions on medium firms 
 
(1) 
medium 
(2) 
labor 
growth 
medium 
(3) 
sales 
growth 
medium 
(4) 
institu-
tions 
(5) 
medium 
(6) 
labor 
growth 
medium 
(7) 
sales 
growth 
medium 
institutions 0.31 
(0.14)** 
26.39 
(6.22)*** 
28.39 
(6.77)*** 
 
2.28 
(1.39)* 
50.79 
(28.70)* 
58.20 
(35.04)* 
instrument 
   
0.64 
(0.19)*** 
   
credit 0.0004 
(0.005) 
0.13 
(0.16) 
0.17 
(0.21) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.03 
(0.41) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
corporate 
rate 
0.0002 
(0.009) 
4.63 
(1.10)*** 
5.32 
(1.19)*** 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
5.73 
(2.18)*** 
6.66 
(2.66)** 
personal 
rate 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.004)*** 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.35) 
-0.05 
(0.43) 
inflation -0.0004 
(0.01) 
1.06 
(0.27)*** 
1.12 
(0.28)*** 
-0.0001    
(0.0001) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
1.79 
(0.97)* 
2.01 
(1.19)* 
ln(gdp/cap) 2.24 
(0.90)** 
-41.41 
(22.51)* 
-19.69 
(30.77) 
1.12 
(0.39)*** 
-1.13 
(2.87) 
-88.92 
(71.58) 
-77.74 
(87.40) 
Country-
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq. 
(overall) 
0.0044 0.0467 0.0458 0.7175 0.0002 0.0488 0.0588 
Observations 210 70 70 1158 210 70 70 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients is shown as follows: * at 10%; 
** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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Finally, in Table 6, I look at the effects of institutions on large firms. Since the 
IFC data does not contain information on large firms, I look only at the effects 
of institutions on firm growth. The institutional quality does not seem to 
affect the labor productivity or sales growth of large firms in the fixed effects 
model. The results do not change once I use an instrument for institutions. 
 
Table 6. The effects of institutions on large firms 
 (1) 
Labor growth 
large 
(2) 
Sales growth 
large 
(3) 
Institutions 
(4) 
Labor growth 
large 
(5) 
Sales growth 
large 
institutions 2.04 
(8.46) 
-0.17 
(9.85) 
 
-7.83 
(64.14) 
33.09 
(296.10) 
instrument 
  
0.64 
(0.19)*** 
  
credit 0.06 
(0.23) 
0.52 
(0.39) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.21 
(1.17) 
0.27 
(2.26) 
corporate 
rate 
-0.40 
(1.70) 
1.73 
(1.23) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.98 
(4.27) 
3.76 
(18.17) 
personal rate 
-0.20 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(0.004)*** 
-0.12 
(0.60) 
0.003 
(1.29) 
inflation 
1.24 
(0.93) 
0.23 
(0.38) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.20 
(7.09) 
1.45 
(10.87) 
ln(gdp/cap) -21.60 
(34.64) 
-2.26 
(36.95) 
1.12 
(0.39)*** 
0.53 
(152.57) 
-66.16 
(571.96) 
Country-
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq. 
(overall) 
0.0011 0.0002 0.7175 0.0342 0.0346 
Observations 55 60 1158 55 60 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients is shown as follows: * at 
10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper investigates the effects of various types of institutions 
(corruption, legal system, regulations, bureaucracy, investment friendliness 
and property rights) on the stock of firms and on the growth of firms. It 
constructs a comprehensive measure based on these six types of institutions. 
It concludes that an increase of one point in the quality of institutions 
(equivalent to raising the quality of the Congolese institutions to the level of 
Zimbabwean institutions) leads to an increase of 2.28 firms per 1,000 
inhabitants, 50.79% improvement in labor productivity growth and 58.20% 
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increase in sales growth for medium firms. Institutions do not play a 
significant role in determining the number of micro or small firms. They also 
do not seem to affect the growth of small or large firms. 
 
The implications of these results are important for public policy in 
developing countries. The usual pro-entrepreneurship measures such as 
private credit to businesses do not encourage firm creation and they do not 
stimulate firm growth if institutions are bad. Strengthening institutions is an 
important step in encouraging the development of medium firms. Failing to 
improve the quality of the institutions could lead to more medium firms 
exiting, leaving on the market only large firms with a lot of market power that 
have incentives to extract rents and little incentives to innovate and create 
growth and micro firms that do not create significant employment and do not 
operate entirely in the formal sector and thus do not pay many taxes. 
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